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Imagine a World Without Hunger:
The Hurdles of Global Justice
Muna Ndulot
I am delighted to offer a few remarks at the beginning of the Cornell
International Law Journal 2006 Symposium, Global Justice: Poverty, Human
Rights, and Responsibilities. We cannot exaggerate the importance of this
topic as we struggle with the effects of poverty, disease, and hunger on the
world scene. Thomas Nagel recently observed the following in this regard:
We do not live in a just world. This may be the least controversial claim one
could make in political theory. But it is much less clear what, if anything,
justice on a world scale might mean or what the hope for justice should lead
us to want in the domain of international or global institutions, and in the
policies of states that are in a position to affect the world order."'
Nagel notes that the nation-state is the primary locus of political legiti-
macy and the pursuit of justice, and it is one of the advantages of domestic
political theory that nation states actually exist. 2 He argues that "when we
are presented with the need for collective action on a global scale, it is very
unclear what, if anything, could play a comparable role." 3 Questions relat-
ing to progress in world governance include: (1) what do we need from
international organizations and states for the purpose of reducing the
global disparity among nations and citizens of the world, and within devel-
oping countries themselves; (2) what theoretical orientation appropriately
allows us to deal with world inequality; and (3) what sort of global institu-
tions are necessary to address global inequality and poverty?
On a global scale, justice demands more from current international
organizations than they are currently able to offer. Although the rule of
state sovereignty does not impose the same degree of constraint on all orga-
nizations (e.g., the Security Council), the governance of international orga-
nizations is generally assumed to be limited by the organizations'
benefactors.4 This is primarily due to the fact that international institu-
tions are established on the basis of mutual agreement among self-inter-
ested parties. Doctrines such as state sovereignty and sovereign immunity
from legal process in foreign jurisdictions constrain the enforcement capa-
bility of these international organizations. Such organizations are empow-
t Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School and Director of Cornell
University's Institute for African Development. My gratitude to Roger 1. Couture for his
excellent research assistance.
1. Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113, 113
(2005).
2. See id.
3. Id. at 113-14.
4. See id. at 132-33.
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ered to act only on behalf of those states and agencies responsible for their
existence and which are signatories to the various instruments that estab-
lish them. Even when these international organizations do act upon mem-
ber states, the latter are often found to be the "middle men", who are
uncomfortably wedged between the respective international organization
and the citizens of the respective nation state.
Another issue of global concern is how to handle nonstate actors.
Without adequate authority over non-participants and members alike,
institutions of justice cannot responsibly respond to the global community.
To achieve justice on a more expansive scale, international organizations
need adequate financial support and delegated authority. Without it, these
organizations will continue to be handicapped in their ability to exercise
coercive enforcement against offending states and individuals. Also, the
organizations' ineffectiveness will continue to disappoint and dishearten
members from the weaker and more impoverished constituencies in the
global community.
Issues hotly debated within the international community relating to
the enforcement of justice within the global community include the follow-
ing: (1) whether we should equip and empower new global institutions; (2)
if so, what sorts of international institutions they should be; and (3) what
sorts of coercive powers these institutions should possess?
At the root of the issue of global justice is the question of the theoreti-
cal underpinnings upon which such a pursuit should be based. To some, a
theory of global justice should specify not only obligations owed by certain
segments of societies to others but also the basis for those obligations. Jus-
tice, as an evaluative standard, may be applied across various dimensions,
including economics, social welfare, and government. Conceptions of jus-
tice can involve rules regarding when the use of force is acceptable, the
rules governing the conduct of warfare, and the rules to promote principles
of human dignity. Human rights instruments, including the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights (UDHR),5 the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 6 the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 7
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 8 and vari-
ous regional instruments such as the American Convention on Human
Rights (ACHR), 9 the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 1° and the African Charter of
Human and People's Rights (ACHPR), 11 exemplify shared convictions
regarding the international applicability of certain standards of justice.
5. U.N. Doc.A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
6. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1966).
7. G.A. Res. 34/180, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979).
8. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
9. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
10. Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
11. Organization of African Unity, African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights,
June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc./CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
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In addition to achieving an undisputed measure of international recog-
nition and respect, such standards have, in the past half-century, become
quite popular among nation states. Contradictorily, gross inequality
among the peoples of the world continues unabated. Clearly, merely pass-
ing conventions, protocols and covenants relating to basic rights and inter-
national criminal accountability is alone inadequate to transform these
standards into a reality. To make the statements a reality requires expan-
sion and empowerment of the underlying mechanisms of enforcement.
For example, the socio-economic rights of the poor to adequate living stan-
dards belong to the same species of human rights as freedom of religious
belief, speech, and association. Thus, socio-economic rights should belong
to the family of enforceable fundamental rights. But, without implement-
ing a broader standard and enforcement mechanism of human justice, the
gruesome results of inequality will remain a blight on the global human
record, and we can expect the situation to worsen.
Regardless of the theoretical view one adopts in applying standards of
justice to the dire situations of poverty worldwide, the world is in a disas-
trous state from a humanitarian perspective. Over one billion people cur-
rently lack access to healthcare, and each year approximately eleven billion
children under the age of five die from malnutrition and from mostly pre-
ventable diseases. 12 In 2002, for example, almost eleven million people
died of infectious diseases alone-far more that the number of those killed
in natural or manmade catastrophes such as war.13 Humanitarian disas-
ters, like that taking place in Darfur, rage on and continue to inflict intoler-
able suffering.
The demands of justice require more than humanitarian assistance to
those desperately in need. From a justice-oriented perspective, the issue is
how we should respond to world inequality. Further, how does this con-
cern differ from a purely humanitarian perspective? Finally, how can we
ensure that the world is organized in such a way that poverty-or at least
extreme poverty-is eradicated?
A popular approach among global humanitarians involves appealing
to human rights to justify global responsibility for assisting the poor.
Because the poor do not possess the means necessary to meet basic human
needs, it is considered a moral duty for the nation states and supranational
institutions to help these people achieve and acquire fundamental rights
and necessities. The importance of meeting these indispensable needs is
noted by Thomas Pogge:
Other, more elementary basic goods are important for both the ethical and
the personal value of human life. Among these are physical integrity, subsis-
tence supplies (of food and drink, clothing, shelter, and basic health care),
12. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION REPORT ON
INFECTIOUS DISEASES: REMOVING OBSTACLES TO HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT (1999) available at
http://www.who.int/infectious-disease-report/index-rpt99 .html.
13. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION FACT SHEET, No.
104, rev. Mar. 2006, available at h ttp://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fslO4/en/
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freedom of movement and action, as well as basic education and economic
participation. All of these basic goods should be recognized as the objects of
human rights- but only up to certain quantitative, qualitative, and probabil-
istic limits: what human beings truly need is secure access to a minimally
adequate share of all of these goods.14
For materially burdened nations, however, the concern for human
rights has proven to be an inadequate basis by which to achieve global
justice and to eradicate poverty. When confronted with the challenges
endemic to famine, poverty, and disease, numerous theories of justice sim-
ply fall short, particularly when it comes to redistribution implications. In
this regard, I wish briefly to discuss four rights-centered theories that have
purported to address the need for redistributing the world's assets: rights-
consequentialism, rights to welfare, John Rawls's theory of justice, and
claim-rights theory.
The fundamental principle underlying the rights-consequentialism
theory is to maximize rights fulfillment. This notion of maximizing conse-
quentialism allows governments to distribute justice based on utilitarian
grounds. The underlying logic allows for otherwise inviolable rights to be
trumped if done in the interest of the greater good. That is to say, in the
context of basic rights, the morally right action is the one with the best
overall consequences.
The rights-consequentialism theory has inherent problems. For exam-
ple, the assortment of goods considered necessary for a minimum standard
of living offers a unique and often insurmountable challenge for poor
nations. A uniform bundle of goods that meets the basic economic rights
of those in one nation may not accommodate another peoples' basic rights
to survival and subsistence. Consider, for example, the needs of pregnant
or disabled persons. 15 Another example involves the right to basic capabil-
ities-the right to do, or to be, certain things throughout the course of one's
life. 16 In addition, there is a difference between having the capability to
deliver certain basic rights and actually possessing those rights. There are
instances in which preferences have been shaped along cultural lines in
ways that preclude certain groups within a population from achieving min-
imal decency. Because disadvantaged people may not know better, they
can grow complacent and accept a substandard way of life. Thus, the
rights-consequentialism theory and its variations fail to accommodate the
concerns unique to distributing justice within poor countries.
The second theory of rights I wish to discuss is the right to welfare
approach. This notion of rights involves the maximization of welfare for a
given population. This view, however, also does not meet the requirements
for a plausible distribution of justice. The basic problem here is that
instead of dictating a standard commitment to human rights, the right to
welfare approach seeks to dispense an arbitrary standard across a given
14. Dale Dorsey, Global Justice and the Limits of Human Rights, 55 PHIL. Q. 562, 562
(2005).
15. Id. at 572.
16. Id. at 573.
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population. Maximizing a substandard notion of decency accomplishes
nothing.
The third theory relates to John Rawls's theory of justice. This rights-
based perspective also does not embrace the non-discriminatory interest in
assuring justice in poor countries. For example, Dale Dorsey argues that
the "difference" principle of the Rawlsian model of justice "might have the
effect of reducing the available resources of those who are able to avoid
starvation to the level at which starvation sets in, greatly increasing the
length and impact of the famine."'1 7 In the context of destitute nations,
Dorsey argues that the priority of distributive justice should be that of alle-
viating deprivation and morbidity for as many as possible in spite of
severely limited resources. Global or domestic justice in this sense involves
the unwavering obligation to fulfill the most basic human needs: subsis-
tence for all peoples.
Claim-rights, the fourth rights-based view, applies the inalienability of
rights to basic needs, such as subsistence. This theory not only makes
Rawls's "difference" principle impossible to achieve, it also fails to recon-
cile the need for basic subsistence with the severe resource scarcity charac-
teristic of materially burdened nations. It de-legitimizes any act by the
government that either violates a claim-right or neglects to fulfill one, even
if such an act is in the interest of promoting the greatest possible level of
subsistence. Overall, the state of affairs within poor countries requires that
global obligations be built on something more than the bedrock of human
rights. This is not to say that human rights do not have a place in the
discourse of the distributional aspects of global justice. They do indeed.
There is a recognition, however, that the human rights argument, by itself,
has proven to be an inadequate basis on which to implement the funda-
mental economic right to survival, of which the world's most desperate
citizens are in dire need.
Martha Nussbaum reminds us of the advantages of a rights approach:
(1) people have justified and urgent claims to certain types of treatment
regardless of what the world around them has done about it; and (2)
'rights' talk is rhetorically powerful.18 Nussbaum is correct in that inalien-
able rights, as noted in her first claim, require no further justification. Her
second point, however, warrants closer inspection. Human rights language
is entrenched in any discourse relating to global justice. In addition, such
language appeals to the sensibilities of concerned citizens of the world and,
therefore, possesses rhetorical appeal. But, at the end of the day, global
justice should first and foremost ensure subsistence and survival for as
many as possible, despite the resource scarcity endemic in the poorer
nations of the world.
The rhetorical power of human rights language in the context of pub-
lic health, however, is two-sided. To properly examine this claim, it is first
17. Id. at 565.
18. See generally Martha Nussbaum, Beyond The Social Contract: Toward Social Jus-
tice, in 24 THE TANNER LECTURES IN HUMAN VALUES (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 2002).
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necessary to understand the role of public health within the sphere of
human rights. Those who assert a fundamental right to adequate health
care emphasize the importance of both individual and collective rights.19
For such advocates the concept of public health as a right goes beyond just
the protection of human rights, demanding government responsibility for
providing adequate health care.2 0 The obligation of the government to
ensure proper health care, according to these proponents, finds its justifica-
tion within Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This
article states that "everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate
for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food,
clothing, housing, medical care and necessary social services, and the right
to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood,
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control."
An example of the domestic use of the right to health as a human right
to advance public health occurred in the South African Treatment Action
Campaign Case.2 ' In this case, a NGO sued the South African government
because of perceived shortcomings in its response to the HIV/AIDS
dilemma. The constitutional court ruled in favor of the NGO and ordered
the South African government to remove the restrictions that prevented
nevirapine from being made available to reduce the risk of mother-to-child
transmission of HIV at public hospitals and clinics. The court ruled that
section 27(1) of the South African Constitution required the government to
devise and implement within its available resources a comprehensive and
coordinated program to progressively realize the rights of pregnant women
and their newborn children to health care services to combat mother-to-
child transmission of HIV/AIDS. Specifically, the court ruled that such a
program must include: (1) reasonable measures for counseling and testing
pregnant women for HIV/AIDS; (2) counseling HIV/AIDS-positive preg-
nant women on the options available to them to reduce the risk of mother-
to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS; and (3) making appropriate treatment
available to pregnant women for such purposes. The court further ordered
the government to do the following: (1) remove restrictions that limited the
availability of nevirapine for the purpose of reducing the risk of mother-to-
child transmission of HIV/AIDS at public hospitals and clinics that are not
research and training sites; (2) permit and facilitate the use of nevirapine
to reduce the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS; and (3)
make nevirapine available for this purpose at hospitals and clinics when, in
the judgment of the attending medical practitioner, this is medically indi-
cated. If necessary, the program shall ensure appropriate testing and coun-
seling at public hospitals and clinics. Finally, reasonable measures should
be adapted to extend testing and counseling facilities at hospitals and clin-
ics throughout the public health sector. In this case the rights approach
19. Peter Jacobson & Soheil Soliman, Co-opting the Health and Human Rights Move-
ment, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 705, 705 (2002).
20. Id.
21. Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Mr.).
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was effective, and the concerned government has begun to implement the
court order.
In Grootboom v. South Africa22 , another case involving the right to
access to housing, the petitioners were successful in court, but they did not
obtain the redress sought. Namely, despite their court victory, the appli-
cants did not get the housing they sought and desperately needed. In
Grootboom, Mrs. Irene Grootboom and several hundred other adults and
children had lived with thousands of others in unsanitary conditions,
namely shacks in a squatter settlement called Wallacadene. The plaintiffs
then moved to private land that had been designated by the municipality as
the future site for construction of low-cost housing. They were subse-
quently evicted from the site and had nowhere to go. The plaintiffs were
seeking shelter in temporary structures on the Wallacedene sports field
when they initiated the court action, asserting the constitutional right of
children to shelter. The constitutional court ruled that Section 26(2) of the
Constitution required the state to devise and implement within its available
resources a comprehensive and coordinated program progressively to real-
ize the right of access to adequate housing, and that this program must
include reasonable measures to provide relief for people who have no
access to land, no roof over their heads, and who are living in intolerable
conditions or crisis situations. The court further ruled that as of the date of
the launch of the application, the state housing program in the area of Cape
Metropolitan Council fell short of compliance with the requirements of
Section 26(2) in that it failed to make reasonable provision within its avail-
able resources for people in the Cape Metropolitan area. The municipality
enforced the order by bulldozing their homes."
These two South African cases teach us some lessons about the rights
approach. When one looks at why the litigants in Treatment Action were
more successful than the Grootboom litigants in compelling government
action after their court victories, one must notice the role and importance
of social movements and publicity. The Treatment campaign movement
mobilized the public and heightened scrutiny of the government's
response, helping to ensure enforcement of the orders of the court. The
situation was rather different for the Grootboom litigants. They did not have
a movement behind them to assure a comparable achievement.
At the international level, a South African case of 1998 exemplifies
another success of the public health rights approach, when coupled with
social movement pressure to ensure that court victories produce tangible
outcomes. This was the case of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa-
tion of South Africa v. The Republic of South Africa. 2 3 In this case the Phar-
maceutical Association of South Africa, on behalf of forty local and
international pharmaceutical manufacturing companies, sued the govern-
ment of South Africa to prevent implementation of the Medicines and
22. Grootboom v The Republic of South Africa 2000 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Mr.).
23. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa v The Republic of South
Africa, 1998 High Court of South Africa, Case No. 4138/98 (S. Mr.).
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Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997. This law was
designed to facilitate low-cost access to AIDS drugs. These pharmaceutical
manufacturers of the country with the largest population of HIV/AIDS in
the world accused the government of circumventing patent protections,
guaranteed by the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of International Rights)
intellectual property rules. The pharmaceutical companies charged that
the South African government, in Section 15 of its Medicines and Related
Substances Control Act, violated the South African Constitution and its
obligations to the World Trade Organization under TRIPS in permitting
manufacturing of medicines without the authorization of the patent own-
ers and in allowing parallel imports of drugs. The pharmaceutical compa-
nies later dropped their lawsuit in the spring of 2001 after an avalanche of
negative international publicity. Treatment Action Campaign (a South
African NGO) and Doctors Without Borders led this publicity campaign. 24
In the international climate that followed, several pharmaceutical compa-
nies entered into agreements with developing countries that lowered the
prices of their AIDS drugs in those countries. Here, the use of publicity,
coupled with social movement activity, proved to be crucial in the quest to
bring justice to the poor.
To return to the notion of human rights language as a double-edged
sword in the public health and human rights movement, some contend that
the rhetorical power of such discourse is questionable when collective
human rights are subordinated to individual civil rights. Human rights
opponents appropriate the rhetorical muscle of human rights language to
counter collective rights-based public health initiatives. By engaging in
civil rights dialogue, they juxtapose individual civil liberties rights and
community rights.
The use of civil rights rhetoric in opposition to the tobacco control
movement exemplifies such a co-optation of human rights language and
concerns. After the rejection of their scientific arguments, the tobacco
industry attempted to neutralize tobacco regulations by arguing that smok-
ers had the right to exercise their personal preferences and engage in cer-
tain social behaviors. 25 They invoked the inviolability of several different
rights, including the private property rights of business owners to deter-
mine how to use their property, the right to smoke, and personal right to
freedom from unnecessary governmental intrusion.
24. See David Barnard, In The High Court of South Africa, Case No. 4138198: The
Global Politics of Access to Low-Cost AIDS Drugs in Poor Countries, 12 KENNEDY INST. ETH-
ics J. 159 (2002). Barnard argues that the coup de grace came when the High Court of
South Africa granted a petition by TAC for a friend of the court status and admitted into
evidence affidavits prepared by TAC that threatened to lay open for public scrutiny
details of drug company research and development costs for AIDS drugs relative to gov-
ernment investments of public funds, as well as other aspects of the manufacturers
advertising and marketing policies and expenditures. The court ruled on TAC's petition
on March 6, 2001. On April 17, 2001 the pharmaceutical manufacturers withdrew their
lawsuit.
25. Id. at 160.
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A similar scenario arose in the disputes over gun control. Using the
individual civil right to keep and bear arms specified in the Second
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, organizations like the National Rifle
Association (NRA) have successfully co-opted human rights arguments for
purposes of gun control. Using individual civil rights to drive policy mak-
ing, the question as to how to bridge the legislative gap between collective
and individual rights rears its head and begs to be addressed.
Some argue that the answer lies in the use of social movements, pub-
licity, and the legal system. To effectively frame human rights issues, sup-
port must first be mobilized locally because industry interest groups wield
less power at the local level. By addressing the dangers particular to a com-
munity, public health advocates can align their interests with those of
members of the local community. Changing public perceptions makes it
easier to embed a different interpretation of human rights into the legal
system. To put collective rights on par with individual ones, human rights
in government must be positively perceived, understood, and interpreted.
Government power too often focuses on what it cannot do, rather than on
what it can and should do. Hence, when a civil right is violated, an indi-
vidual may challenge the government on those grounds, but claims of enti-
tlement bear no force.
Before global justice can achieve its necessary goals of nondiscrimina-
tion for all peoples, proponents expect that our global institutions must
acquire global legitimacy. Further, because health care, for example,
serves as an integral part of the basic right to survival, embedding the con-
cept of collective human rights within legal systems and social movements
is of great importance. The proper goal of distributive global justice must
be to provide a standard of living at a level sufficient to meet basic subsis-
tence standards and to ensure survival for as many people throughout the
world as possible. In the end, we cannot accomplish the goals of global
justice involving health care, acceptable standards of living, and social
equality until we empower international institutions to bring them about.

